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Problem definition: How should decision rights be allocated between firms occupying di↵erent positions
in the value chain to maximize the value of a co-development project?
Academic/Practical Relevance: We contribute to the OM literature on the benefits and challenges
of co-development initiatives by looking at the design of optimal governance structures that specify the
allocation of rights to make certain decisions. Our problem is motivated by real-world challenges observed
in co-development project initiation discussions between technology companies. We utilize a game-theoretic
model to study the allocation of the ex-ante right to set the contract terms and the ex-post right to choose
which contract to implement, once the market potential is realized.
Results: First, we find that delegating more control to a party, does not necessarily imply that the party
will be incentivized to exert greater e↵ort. Specifically, we show that allocating both rights to the seller as
opposed to only the ex-ante right, actually reduces his e↵ort. Second, when the buyer has low bargaining
power, the ex-post decision right should be delegated to the seller, i.e., the party with lower exposure to
the e↵ort-contingent outcome. Otherwise, the ex-post decision right should be delegated to the buyer but
the ex-ante right should be held by the seller. Finally, we show that simple contracts with decision rights
outperform a spot contract when the ex-post bargaining power of one of the parties is substantially higher.
Managerial Implications: Our results o↵er insights for how managers should structure the optimal gov-
ernance structure for co-development projects. We also identify when and how companies should delegate
rights to their partners to maximize the value of the project. We show that the optimal governance structure
depends crucially on the position in the value chain of the party with the higher bargaining power.
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1. Introduction
Interfirm collaborative agreements are one of the predominant mechanisms that firms use to gain
a competitive advantage. This is particularly true in industries characterized by high levels of
uncertainty and substantial development costs (Hagedoorn 2002). This paper focuses on such co-
development agreements in which firms invest resources to co-create a new product or service.
Co-development agreements are commonly practiced in high tech industries such as the telecom-
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munication and microelectronic equipment, semiconductor industry as well as complex IT products
and services. They are fundamentally di↵erent than arms-length licensing agreements of an existing
technology as both parties work together to co-create a new technology or product (Bhaskaran and
Krishnan 2009, Ryall and Sampson 2009). They are also di↵erent than strategic alliances in that
the firms do not create a separate organizational unit to launch a project nor do they extend their
collaboration across their entire product portfolio (see Gerwin and Ferris 2004 for a classification
of the various types of alliances).
Co-development initiatives are typical in the semiconductor industry, particularly for the design
and development of innovative products. Consider the joint development project for the next
generation of NAND flash memory products by Sandisk and Toshiba. Sandisk’s strategy is to
create new markets for NAND flash memory through constantly improving the performance of
its products. For instance, technology advances can reduce the cost per bit by increasing the
density of the memory chips on the wafer. Such performance improvements on the memory have
significant impact on the demand for Sandisk’s products that use NAND flash memory (e.g., USB
drives, cameras, media players, smartphones) (Sandisk Corp. 2011, p. 3). While the NAND flash
memory is manufactured by Toshiba (Sandisk Corp. 2011, p. 4), developing such improvements
requires Sandisk and Toshiba to undertake joint research and development activities. Similarly,
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and MediaTek joined forces to design
state-of-the-art microchips that build on the technology of TSMC to develop “the best and most
competitive Internet of Things (IoT) product solutions” for the customers of MediaTek (TSMC
2016).
Co-development projects are also common in the information and communication technology
(ICT) industry. We engaged in several project initiation discussions between a large telecom-
munication equipment provider (seller) and its di↵erent potential partners, typically information
technology services companies (buyers), which were interested in working with the seller to develop
bespoke IT systems for their customers. For instance, a co-development project with one buyer
(hereafter named as Buyer A) aimed to develop an innovative design for a data center management
system. Such a system would o↵er real-time data management services leading to more e cient
energy use and reduced disruption times. Specifically, the seller would focus on the hardware com-
ponents (e.g., low voltage sensors) and Buyer A would focus on developing the software to integrate
those components in the platform. The end-product would be a hardware equipment (that would
be manufactured by the seller) that would enable a complete and transparent view of the data
center. This would allow Buyer A to o↵er a higher-quality service to her clients who were becom-
ing increasingly concerned about the energy e ciency of their data centers. Thus, the technology
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developments in the integrated platform would have a significant impact on the demand for Buyer
A’s product.
The above examples are typical of co-development agreements where a firm positioned upstream
in the value chain (hereafter referred to as the seller) works with a firm positioned downstream
in the value chain (hereafter referred to as the buyer). Both parties make investments to develop
an innovative technology, which influences the demand for the buyer’s product. Such agreements
allow firms to pursue the development of innovative initiatives through collaboration which results
in a more e cient sharing of the substantial development costs. Yet, and precisely because of the
innovative nature of such projects, incentivizing the participating firms to invest e ciently can
be challenging. First, given the highly specialized expertise required for the development of these
products, it is hard to verify the e↵ort exerted by each party. Moreover, given that the result
of these development e↵orts is an intermediate output that will constitute only part of the end-
product/service, it is extremely di cult to make future rewards contingent on the final outcome in
a way that they can be enforceable by a court. For example, in the information technology platform
described above, the new product will be sold by Buyer A bundled together in a more wide-ranging
service o↵ering (e.g., consulting services by Buyer A). This absence of outcome-dependent contracts
gives rise to the well-known holdup problem (Grossman and Hart 1986), and ine cient levels of
investments.
The seminal framework of Grossman and Hart (1986) suggests that a mechanism to overcome
the under-investment problem is to transfer property/decision rights of the key project assets
to the party whose e↵ort is most critical for the success of the project. This mitigates any rent
appropriation concerns due to opportunistic behavior once the uncertainty has been resolved, and
therefore, encourages upfront investments. Accordingly, there is widespread use of such contractual
provisions, i.e., decision rights, across a range of industries such as oil and gas (Masten and Crocker
1985, Goldberg and Erickson 1987), pharmaceuticals (Lerner and Merges 1998), high-tech and IT
services (Ryall and Sampson 2009, Susarla 2012).
Such contractual provisions that give one party control over specific decisions of the project are
also considered in co-development initiatives. In the example of the IT services co-development
initiative, the seller expressed a strong interest in designing the new network device, but stated that
the project would only be attractive to him if a “su cient” number of units were to be deployed
for the new service. In particular, the seller requested a substantial quantity commitment by Buyer
A with the option for the seller to deliver any quantity up to that level. Such a commitment
e↵ectively transfers control over the quantity decision to the seller. At the same time, Buyer A did
not want to give up control over this decision. In the end, despite the strong synergies between the
two companies, the project was abandoned, precisely because they never reached an agreement on
Agrawal and Oraiopoulos:
4 The Role of Decision Rights in Co-development Initiatives
which party should hold the quantity decision right. Interestingly, in a co-development initiative
with a di↵erent buyer (hereafter named as Buyer B), the project was successfully initiated under
a governance structure where the seller held the quantity decision right.
Such agreements that give a party the right to control a specific decision are also common
in the semiconductor industry. For example, in the Sandisk-Toshiba collaboration, Sandisk was
contractually obligated to purchase up to 50% of output produced by Toshiba for this initiative
(Sandisk Corp. 2011, p. 4). Such a commitment transfers the control over the quantity decision
to Toshiba, the party responsible for manufacturing the products. Having the seller retain the
control over quantity decisions is also typical in microchip manufacturing, and particularly among
the largest semiconductor manufacturers, such as TSMC (Clarke 2006). As the above examples
suggest, which party has the right to make certain key decisions such as the quantity is a critical
issue that arises in co-development initiatives. Another such critical decision involves who sets the
contract terms. Given that the total surplus created may depend on which party (buyer or seller)
sets the contract terms, the party who has the initial right to make these decisions may benefit
from delegating this right to the other party.
Motivated by the above examples, our work seeks to understand how decision rights should be
allocated between firms occupying di↵erent positions in the value chain to maximize the value of the
project. Existing research focuses on settings where the collaborating parties have clearly defined
roles (e.g., when one party is primarily responsible for the research activities and the other for
the marketing activities or for financing the project). In that case, the Grossman and Hart (1986)
framework provides definitive hypotheses about the optimal allocation of decision rights. That
is, the party whose e↵ort is most critical should hold the decision right for that particular stage
(e.g., see Lerner and Merges 1998 for applications in the pharmaceutical industry). In contrast,
co-development implies that the contribution of both parties can be crucial during the development
stage.1 Moreover, another challenge with co-development initiatives is that they frequently require
a “pure co-operative” investment, which as defined by Che and Hausch (1999), is an investment
where the e↵ort of one party generates a direct benefit only for their partner. For example, an
upstream seller, who has to exert e↵ort to improve the demand potential for his buyer’s product
(as in our motivating examples). This is fundamentally di↵erent to “selfish” investments, where a
seller invests in reducing his production cost or a buyer invests in increasing her demand potential
(see the discussion in Che and Hausch 1999). Within such a co-development setting, our primary
1 This is also stressed in Ryall and Sampson (2009), who argue that given the lack of theory to guide the development
of appropriate hypotheses in co-development settings, they choose a rather exploratory approach in their study of
joint technology development projects.
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research question is: Who should be allocated the ex-ante right to set the contract terms, and who
should be allocated the ex-post decision right to choose from the proposed contracts?
We develop a model to study co-development initiatives where a buyer and a seller exert e↵orts
to improve the market potential of the project. That is, the seller makes a pure co-operative
investment to improve the value of the project. We focus on innovative projects for which future
payments cannot be made contingent on future outcomes, such as the realized market potential of
the project. Instead, the parties consider a menu of non-contingent contracts, each of which specify
a quantity and an associated transfer payment. A key characteristic of our model is the governance
structure, which specifies the allocation of di↵erent rights between the two parties. In line with our
motivating examples and industry interactions, we focus on the following two rights: The contract
terms are set upfront by the party who holds the right to do so. We refer to this right as the
ex-ante right because the contract terms are set before the market potential is realized. Once the
market potential is realized, the decision of which contract to implement is made by the party who
holds the ex-post decision right. We examine four governance structures that di↵er based on the
allocation of these two rights to identify which governance structure should be preferred by the
parties.
Our results o↵er several insights for firms that engage in co-development initiatives. First, we
find that delegating more control to a party, does not necessarily imply that the party will be
incentivized to exert greater e↵ort. Specifically, we show that allocating both rights to the seller
as opposed to only the ex-ante right, actually reduces his e↵ort. Second, while the seller exerts no
e↵ort when the buyer has both rights, the buyer exerts e↵ort even when the seller has both rights.
This result highlights how the position of a party in the value chain plays a key role in its incentive
to invest in the co-development initiative.
Moreover, our analysis o↵ers insights on how firms should choose a governance structure for a
co-development initiative. In industries characterized by powerful sellers, such as the semiconductor
industry, where sellers such as TSMC and Toshiba are powerful because of their specialization
and scale (McKinsey 2011, p.25), it is important that the seller holds the ex-post decision right.
In contrast, in settings where the buyer might have high ex-post bargaining power, such as our
example from the ICT industry between the large telecommunication equipment provider and
Buyer A (who maintained long-term relationships with key end-customers), the buyer should hold
the ex-post decision right, but the seller should hold the ex-ante right to set the contract terms.
Lastly, we find that renegotiation, which is usually thought of as an impediment to incentivizing
the collaborating parties (e.g., hold-up problem), can actually be a powerful way of aligning the
interests of the firms, and therefore, maximizing the value from a co-development initiative.
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2. Literature Review
The benefits and challenges of co-development have been the subject of a number of recent papers
in operations management. Corbett and DeCroix (2001) study a setting where a seller and buyer
both exert e↵orts to reduce the consumption of an indirect material and the production cost. They
show that shared-savings contracts improve the total profitability, but may not always lead to
lower environmental impact. Their framework is extended in Corbett et al. (2005) to examine the
optimality of linear contracts in the presence of double moral hazard. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003)
highlight the holdup problem in a supply chain setting where a firm exerts e↵ort on innovations
that reduces the partner’s variable cost (or stimulate demand). They examine whether the seller
should commit to a price ex-ante in order to encourage innovation or wait and set the price
after the demand has been realized. Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) compare the e↵ectiveness
of di↵erent approaches between two firms such as sharing revenues, development costs or e↵orts
in settings where both the e↵orts and outcomes are observable and contractible. For settings
where e↵orts are unobservable and monitoring is costly, Roels et al. (2010) compare fixed-price,
time and material, and performance-based contracts. More recently, Bhattacharya et al. (2013)
show how gain-sharing contracts outperform cost-plus contracts in an IT setting of joint product
development between a client and a customer support center. Bhattacharya et al. (2014) study
the e ciency of milestone-based options contracts in a bilateral research and development (R&D)
partnership between a risk-averse provider that conducts early-stage research and a risk-neutral
client that performs late-stage development activities. They show that milestone-based options
contracts pareto dominate buyout options contracts when the provider has some bargaining power
in renegotiation. A common characteristic of the above papers is that the outcome of the co-
development e↵orts, is fully observable and verifiable, and as such, contracts contingent on this
outcome can be written upfront. However, as discussed earlier, the open-ended nature of many
co-development agreements prohibits the writing of such outcome-contingent contracts.
Instead, firms often rely on “simple” contracts, i.e., contracts in which future payments are not
contingent on the outcome. The importance and wide applicability of such simple contracts is high-
lighted in a stream of operations management (OM) papers that study their e cacy in di↵erent
settings. Van Mieghem (1999) analyzes the performance of non-contingent contracts on capacity
investment levels in the context of subcontracting. Plambeck and Taylor (2006) derive the opti-
mal structure of informal agreements (i.e., relational contracts) that make payments contingent
on a non-contractible outcome in a setting where the two parties repeat the same transaction in
subsequent periods. Plambeck and Taylor (2007a) show that simple (i.e., fixed-quantity) contracts
can induce optimal investments in innovation and capacity, if the firms can properly design the
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renegotiation process. Kim and Netessine (2013) show that price, quantity, or price-quantity com-
mitments fail to induce collaborative e↵orts aiming at reducing the seller’s production cost. As
such, they suggest an alternative mechanism which they coin expected margin commitment in
which the seller is guaranteed to earn a fixed margin above the expected unit cost. Li (2013) also
examines the role of price commitments in inducing seller e↵ort by a manufacturer when the latter
can also adjust his supply base (i.e., the number of sellers). She shows that supply base design
and pricing mechanism are strategic complements, and as such, decisions pertaining to them need
to be coordinated. Rahmani et al. (2017) consider a dynamic collaborative process and show that
simple contracts can perform surprisingly well when the project completion is determined by its
current state or an exogenous deadline. Xiao and Xu (2012) show that in royalty-based contracts,
contingent payments are critical as they act as substitutes or complements to the value added by
the possibility of renegotiation. However, none of the above papers examines the role of decision
rights. Our paper contributes to this stream of research by explicitly examining how the allocation
of such rights a↵ects the e cacy of non-contingent contracts to induce co-operative investments.
As mentioned before, a stream of research in economics studies the role of property/decision
rights (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1988). Prior work in economics also analyzes
non-contingent contracts, especially ones that appropriately design the renegotiation stage (Chung
1991, Aghion et al. 1994, Nöldeke and Schmidt 1995). Renegotiation design refers to the “design
of rules that govern the process of renegotiation” (Aghion et al. 1994, p. 257), and e↵ectively
determine the ex-post bargaining power of the two parties. Yet, these papers, along with most
of the subsequent ones on incomplete contracts (see Tirole 1999 for a thorough review) focus on
the so-called “selfish” investments where the seller invests in reducing his production cost and/or
the buyer invests in increasing the value he gains from the product. Importantly, Che and Hausch
(1999) show that the findings of previous work on the value of simple contracts (without any
allocation of decision rights) under “selfish” investments are not transferable to settings of “co-
operative” investments. We contribute to this literature by studying non-contingent contracts with
allocation of decision rights for co-operative investments.
The OM literature on the role of decision rights has primarily been focused on the e↵ectiveness
of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) programs (Cachon and Fisher 1997) and more broadly on
inventory and procurement ownership decisions (Netessine and Rudi 2006, Randall et al. 2006,
Kayis et al. 2013). In the context of knowledge-intensive services, where information transfer and
processing are costly, Xue and Field (2008) study whether it should be the client or the service
provider the party who decides on how the work between the two parties should be divided. They
show that the decision right should be held by the most productive party, i.e., the party who has
the lower cost for transferring and processing information. In the context of pharmaceutical R&D,
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Savva and Scholtes (2014) show that the inclusion of opt-out options that give the partners the
right to exit a joint project, can significantly improve the e ciency of licensing contracts. In a
similar context, Crama et al. (2016) study the structure of optimal licensing contracts between an
innovator and a marketer, who invest sequentially in research and marketing, respectively. They
examine the conditions under which the innovator would transfer the launch decision right to the
marketer as well as the e↵ects of a buy-out or a take-back option.
Our paper makes several unique contributions to the existing literature: First, we study how the
allocation of ex-ante and ex-post decision rights a↵ects the joint output created under simultaneous
and co-operative investments. In contrast to the existing literature that assumes that one of the
parties has the ex-ante right, we investigate whether and when the ex-ante right should be delegated
to the other party. We also investigate two di↵erent types of ex-post decision rights, namely quantity
and termination rights. Second, we allow for renegotiation of the contract terms and show that
the ex-post bargaining power of the two parties needs to be jointly considered with the allocation
of decision rights. Third, we also examine the value of contracting (i.e., compare simple contracts
with decision rights versus spot contracts) in this context.
3. Model
We consider a risk-neutral buyer (denoted by B) who collaborates with an upstream risk-neutral
seller (denoted by S) to undertake a joint development initiative. This initiative aims to create a
product to capture a new market opportunity in a highly uncertain environment. The initiative
specifies a governance structure that outlines the allocation of the rights to make specific decisions
during the course of the project, and a menu of non-contingent contracts.2 Subsequently, the seller
and buyer exert development e↵orts that stochastically improve the market potential of the project.
Once the development stage is completed, the market potential is realized, and the terms of the ex-
ante contract are executed (potentially after renegotiation). The sequence of events is summarized
in Figure 1 and a table of notation is provided in §OE of the Online Supplement.
Figure 1 Sequence of events.
Contracting
Buyer and Seller 
exert efforts







2 In Section 6, we consider the case where the parties do not sign an ex-ante contract and instead simply rely on
ex-post negotiation for trade (also referred to as the spot contract).
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3.1 Market potential and co-development e↵orts
The market potential depends on the e↵orts of the buyer and seller, which are exerted simulta-
neously. Let eB and eS denote the e↵ort of the buyer and the seller, respectively. These e↵orts
are nonverifiable, and therefore, non-contractible. The cost of e↵ort x for either party is given by
C(x) = cx2, where c > 0. Accordingly, we assume that the e↵ort cost is the same for both parties,
which implies that in our model, any di↵erences in their decisions is driven solely by their position
in the value chain.3 In a co-development initiative, certain tasks may be more expensive for one
party to undertake compared to the other. Therefore, both parties exerting e↵orts can lead to
lower costs than if the same e↵ort had to be exerted only by one of the parties (see Bhaskaran
and Krishnan 2009 and references therein). Such economies of scale in development are captured
by the convex increasing property of the cost function.4






H with probability p(eB, eS),
L with probability 1  p(eB, eS),
where H > L > 0. We assume a linear inverse demand function, i.e., the per-unit selling price
is given by M  Q, when Q products are put on the market (see Padmanabhan and Png 1997,
Plambeck and Taylor 2005, 2007b for a similar model). Note that since the parties’ e↵orts influence
the probability of achieving high market potential, a low market potential may be realized even
after exerting high e↵orts. As such, if one party could observe the e↵ort of the other, a low market
potential outcome (M = L) could never constitute su cient evidence for the court to impose a
penalty (i.e., the e↵ort would remain non-verifiable). We assume that p(eB, eS)
.
= eB + eS in order
to model how the parties’ e↵orts influence the probability of market realization (see Xiao and Xu
2012 for a similar specification).5 Note that our model represents a setting where both parties’
e↵orts generate a direct benefit only for the buyer, i.e., the seller’s e↵ort is a pure co-operative
investment, whereas the buyer’s e↵ort is a selfish investment (cf., Che and Hausch 1999).
3 We consider an extension in §OA in the Online Supplement, where the cost of e↵ort is di↵erent for the parties
and show that most of our key results and insights continue to hold. Moreover, this extension o↵ers some additional
insights about when to opt for development instead of co-development. For example, we find that a party may choose
to simply rely on development when the buyer has a significant e↵ort cost advantage over the seller.
4 In settings where such economies of scale do not exist, parties will find it less attractive to pursue co-development
initiatives.
5 We can consider a more general specification of the form p(eB , eS) =  (eB + eS)+ (1  )eBeS with   2 (0,1], where
  = 1 represents the specification used in our main analysis. It yields similar structural and qualitative insights as
our main analysis. See §OB in the Online Supplement for more details.
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3.2 Contracting
The market potential is observable by both parties but not verifiable. In our co-development setting,
the market potential is typically closely linked to the technical milestones achieved by the joint
e↵orts of the parties. For example, both parties are aware that if a certain performance threshold
is achieved, a higher price can be commanded in the market. This implies that the realization of M
is observable by both parties. However, for such innovative co-development projects, it is di cult
to write formal contracts that are contingent on the market realization (Loch et al. 2006, Susarla
2012). As such, the market potential is not verifiable by a third party, and future payments cannot
be made contingent on it. However, payments can be made contingent on the production quantity,
Q, which is verifiable.
Specifically, we consider a setting where one party (the buyer or the seller) o↵ers a take-it-or-
leave-it menu of contracts to the other party, who has to choose whether to accept or reject it.
The party making the o↵er is usually the one that it is ex-ante more powerful. However, the total
surplus created may depend on which party makes these o↵ers. Accordingly, the party that initially
holds the right to make take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers may prefer to delegate this right to the other party
(as will be shown later in the paper). Accordingly, a governance structure ij with i, j 2 {B,S}
specifies the allocation of two di↵erent rights:
• Party i holds the ex-ante right to set the contract terms and o↵er a menu of non-contingent
contracts to the other party. Specifically, each of these contracts specifies a transfer payment t
from the buyer to the seller for delivering a quantity Q.6 Recall that the realized demand state can
be high or low in our model. Therefore, without loss of generality, by the revelation principle, we
can consider a menu of such schemes denoted by (tL,QL) and (tH ,QH) for the low- and the high-
quantity contracts, respectively.7 Accordingly, let the terms of the menu of contracts be denoted
by  
.
= {tL,QL, tH ,QH}.
• Party j holds the ex-post decision right, which entitles him/her to choose a particular contract
from the menu after the demand state is realized. Let the contract chosen by party j be denoted
by Mj where Mj 2 {L,H}.
3.3 Production and Renegotiation
After the market potential M is realized and observed by both parties, party j who holds the
ex-post decision right chooses a contract Mj, which determines the default allocation (tMj ,QMj ).




= (M  QMj )QMj   tMj
6 We also consider an extension in §7.2 where the parties sign a revenue-sharing contract.
7 Note that given the one-to-one mapping between the quantity and per-unit selling price in our model, choosing the
quantity Q is equivalent to deciding the per-unit selling price for the product, which is given by M  Q.
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= tMj  kQMj , where 0< k <L denotes the unit production cost faced by the seller
to manufacture and deliver the product to the buyer.8 Instead of trading an ine cient quantity,
the parties can renegotiate to the e cient quantity. In line with prior work on renegotiation (Edlin
and Reichelstein 1996), we adopt the Generalized Nash Bargaining model for the renegotiation
outcome where the bargaining power of the buyer is denoted by ↵, and the bargaining power of the
seller by 1  ↵. Note that even though ex-ante one of the parties makes take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers,
the relationship-specific investments of the two parties, give rise to ex-post bargaining (i.e., the
Fundamental Transformation, see Williamson 1979).
























= (M   Q   k)M is the total surplus given a quantity decision Q and realized
demand state M , and Qe(M) = argmax0QM ⇡e(Q|M) is the e cient quantity that maximizes
the total surplus.
3.4 Problem formulation
Under a governance structure ij with i, j 2 {B,S}, that allocates the ex-ante right to party i
and the ex-post decision right to party j, party i’s problem of setting the terms for the menu of
contracts can be considered as choosing a direct mechanism   = {tL,QL, tH ,QH}. Party i may be
able to choose an incentive-feasible mechanism, i.e., one that induces party j to choose the (tL,QL)
contract when the demand state is low and the (tH ,QH) contract when the demand state is high.








0 2 {L,H}. Let the set of incentive-feasible mechanisms when party j has the ex-post
decision right be denoted by  F (j). Note that the incentive-feasibility conditions are only required
when the same party does not hold both the rights (i 6= j). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the reservation utility of both parties is normalized to zero.
Under a given incentive-feasible mechanism   and governance structure ij, the parties’ problems






















(H|H)+ (1  p(eB, eS))⇧ S(L|L) C(eS).
8 This assumption implies that is e cient to o↵er the product even when M = L. In §7.1, we consider an extension
with L< k <H, where it is e cient to o↵er the product only when M =H. When M = L, it is e cient to instead
terminate the initiative and not o↵er the product.
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(eB, eS) denote the optimal e↵ort lev-
els. Accordingly, party i’s problem to choose an incentive-feasible mechanism   under a given





























































Note that this formulation implies that party i o↵ers a contract that maximizes her expected














optimal mechanism chosen by party i under a given governance structure ij, and let the resulting






In this section, we compare the e cacy of di↵erent governance structures by determining the
equilibrium e↵ort levels under each one of them. In each case, we solve the model using backward
induction to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium. We begin by solving for the first-best case
where the e↵orts are chosen to maximize the total surplus. Then, we examine each of the four
governance structures described earlier. For brevity and expositional clarity, we relegate the proofs
and the expressions for equilibrium decisions to the Appendix.
4.1 First-best Case.
Under the first-best case, for a given realization of demand potential M , the e cient quantity
Qe(M) is chosen to maximize the total surplus ⇡e(Q|M). It can be shown that Qe(M) = M k2 (see






= p(eB, eS)⇡e(Qe(H)|H)+ (1  p(eB, es))⇡e(Qe(L)|L) C(eB) C(eS),
where UF (eB, eS) is jointly concave in eB and eS (see Appendix §A1). Let eFB and eFS denote the












) < 1 holds if and
only if c > (H L)(H 2k+L)
4
. Therefore, for the rest of the analysis, we assume that this condition
holds, which will also ensure that p(eB, eS) is less than 1 under any governance structure.
9 The inclusion of an ex-ante participation constraint implicitly assumes that the parties cannot unilaterally renege
from the contract ex post (Chen et al. 2016), which is reasonable in our context. Our model can be adapted for the
situation where the parties can renege by including interim participation constraints. We find that such a modification
only influences the cases where one party does not hold both the rights (BS and SB). For these cases, while the
transfer payments are di↵erent, the equilibrium e↵orts and total surplus remain unchanged. Therefore, all our key
results continue to hold (for brevity, details available on request).
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4.2 Buyer has the ex-post decision right (j =B).
We begin by considering governance structures where the buyer holds the ex-post decision right.
The next result shows that without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to renegotiation-
proof mechanisms.
Lemma 1. When the ex-post decision right is held by the buyer (j = B), given any incentive-








,Qe(H)} that is also incentive feasible.





=Qe(L). The party holding the ex-ante right sets the incentive-feasible mechanism   2
 F (B) anticipating its e↵ect on the e↵orts, eB and eS. We proceed by considering the governance
structure where the buyer holds both rights (i= B). Under this structure, the buyer proposes a
menu of contracts to the seller before they exert co-development e↵orts, and also holds the right
to choose from the contracts ex post.





), while the seller does not exert any e↵ort (eBB
S







When the buyer has both rights, she sets the contract terms anticipating their e↵ect on the
seller’s incentive to exert e↵ort. The higher the payment tH is, the more incentivized the seller
would be to exert e↵ort. At the same time, however, a high payment tH lowers the value that the
buyer can appropriate from the high demand realization. According to Proposition 1, when the






) so low that the seller is indi↵erent between the high and low demand state.
Put di↵erently, the buyer only reimburses the seller for his production cost (UBB
S
= 0), irrespective
of the demand realization, and as such, the seller exerts no e↵ort in the project.
The above result is in line with Kim and Netessine (2013) who show that price commitments
(simple contracts) lead to zero e↵ort from at least one of the parties, and Che and Hausch (1999)
who show that for pure co-operative investments, simple contracts fail to induce e↵orts by the
party not benefiting directly from the investment.
We next consider the governance structure, where the ex-ante right is delegated to the seller
(i= S). Under this structure, the seller sets the contract terms, but the buyer holds the right to
choose from them ex post. Proposition 2 compares the equilibrium e↵ort levels with the case where
both rights are held by the buyer.
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Proposition 2. When only the ex-ante right is delegated to the seller, the seller exerts more













> kQe(H) and tSBL > kQe(L).
Recall from Proposition 1, that when the buyer holds both rights, the seller does not exert any
e↵ort. When the seller holds the ex-ante right, he maximizes his payo↵ by increasing the payments
tH and tL. However, these are constrained by the incentive-feasibility conditions for the buyer, who
holds the ex-post decision right.
The seller sets the payment tH such that the incentive-feasibility constraint for the high-demand
state is binding and the payment tL such that the buyer’s ex-ante participation constraint is
binding. In other words, the buyer enjoys a positive payo↵ under the high-demand state, but merely
breaks even under the low-demand state. Accordingly, the buyer has an incentive to exert e↵ort
to reach the high-demand state. However, note that the buyer now has to pay higher transfer
payments to procure the product, and therefore benefits less from a high-demand state than when
she holds both rights. That is why, the buyer exerts lower e↵ort compared to the case described
in Proposition 1. As the seller appropriates the remaining value from a high-demand realization,
he now has an incentive to exert e↵ort. Therefore, both parties exert e↵orts under this governance
structure.
4.3 Seller has the ex-post decision right (j = S).
We next consider governance structures where the seller holds the ex-post decision right. We first
analyze whether an incentive-feasible renegotiation-proof mechanism can be designed.
Lemma 2. When the ex-post decision right is held by the seller (j = S), regardless who holds the
ex-ante right, a renegotiation-proof contract cannot be incentive feasible.









(H|L), which simplify to tH   kQe(H)  tL   kQe(L) and
tH   kQe(H) tL   kQe(L). It can be readily seen that there are no tH and tL values for which
the seller would strictly prefer the (tH ,Qe(H)) contract when M =H, and the (tL,Qe(L)) contract
when M =L. Intuitively, the seller’s payo↵ does not depend on the realization of demand potential
M , and therefore, it is not possible to design a contract that induces an e cient decision under
each realization of state M (cf., Tirole 1999, p. 755). This result illustrates that the position in
the value chain of the party who holds the ex-post decision right crucially influences whether a
renegotiation-proof contract is incentive feasible, or alternatively, whether the parties’ payo↵s are
the outcome of renegotiation.
Given that the mechanism cannot be renegotiation proof, the seller will choose the contract that
o↵ers a higher payo↵. As the seller’s payo↵ does not depend on the state, he will choose the same
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contract under both high and low demand realizations. In particular, there are two possibilities





(H|H), then the seller always chooses the (tL,Qe(L)) contract and renegoti-





(H|H), then the seller always chooses the (tH ,Qe(H)) contract and renego-
tiation takes place when M =L.
The next lemma investigates which of the above possibilities occurs in equilibrium.
Lemma 3. When the ex-post decision right is held by the seller, regardless who holds the ex-ante
right, in equilibrium, the contract terms are set such that the seller always chooses the contract
which is e cient in the low state. Therefore, renegotiation takes place only when M =H.
Renegotiation allows a party to appropriate additional value, proportional to her/his bargaining
power, once the market potential is realized. Given that a renegotiation-proof contract is not
feasible (see Lemma 2), the party who sets the contract terms prefers to have the renegotiation
taking place under the high-demand rather than the low-demand realization. By doing so, s/he can
use renegotiation as an additional lever to induce her/his partner to exert e↵ort towards the high-
demand state. Conversely, if renegotiation occurred at the low-demand state, it would disincentivize
the collaborating party to invest towards the high-demand state.
We can now analyze the equilibrium e↵orts under the governance structures where the seller
holds the ex-post decision right.
Proposition 3. When the seller holds the ex-post decision right, the equilibrium e↵orts are the









The above result shows that when the seller holds the ex-post right, the allocation of the ex-ante
right does not a↵ect the equilibrium e↵ort levels. This counter-intuitive result is driven by the fact
that the parties’ incentive to exert e↵ort does not depend on the contract terms when the seller
holds the ex-post decision right. The reason for this is as follows: The seller never chooses the
(tH ,Qe(H)) contract (see Lemma 3), so its terms are irrelevant for the parties’ incentive to exert
e↵ort. Moreover, the (tL,Qe(L)) contract is always chosen by the seller. In the case of low-demand
realization, the contract is executed without renegotiation, while in the case of high-demand real-
ization it forms the disagreement outcomes for the renegotiation. In either case, the status-quo
payo↵s are the same, and therefore, the parties’ incentive to exert e↵ort does not depend on the
contract terms. Instead, the additional value that each party can appropriate from the high-demand
realization is entirely determined by its respective bargaining power during the renegotiation stage.




(L|L) and renegotiation takes place in both states. However,
it can be shown that it is always dominated (for brevity, details available on request).
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Corollary 1. When the buyer holds both rights, the seller exerts no e↵ort (eBB
S
= 0). When
the seller holds both rights, the buyer exerts a strictly positive e↵ort (eSS
B
> 0).
The above result notes a sharp contrast between the governance structures where the same party
holds both rights. Yet, when the buyer holds both rights, the seller exerts no e↵ort towards the
project, while the buyer exerts a strictly positive e↵ort even if the seller holds both rights. The
reason behind this result is as follows: When the buyer holds both rights, she o↵ers a renegotiation-
proof contract, which is structured such that the seller is indi↵erent between the high and the low
demand states. In contrast, when the seller holds both rights, the buyer is able to renegotiate under
the high demand state, and extract additional value. That is why, the buyer remains incentivized
to exert e↵ort, even though the seller maintains both rights. This result highlights that the position
in the value chain of the party who holds both rights, plays a key role in determining the co-
development e↵orts.
Corollary 2. The seller exerts lower e↵ort when he has both rights than when he only has the






Conventional wisdom suggests that delegating additional rights can be an e↵ective mechanism
to incentivize a party to exert e↵ort. Accordingly, one may expect that when the seller holds
both rights as opposed to only one of the rights, he would exert higher e↵ort towards the project.
However, the above result shows that this is not true. The seller exerts lower e↵ort when he has
both rights, than the case where he only holds the ex-ante right. Therefore, if the seller already
holds the ex-ante right, allocating the ex-post decision right to him will lower his e↵ort.
To see why this happens, recall that when the seller holds only the ex-ante right, he can o↵er a
renegotiation-proof contract that allows him to appropriate the entire value of the joint initiative,
while still incentivizing the buyer to exert e↵ort. Transferring the ex-post decision right to the seller
implies that a renegotiation-proof contract is no longer feasible. Instead, the bargaining power of
each party determines the value they will appropriate from the total renegotiation surplus, and
therefore, their incentives to exert e↵ort (see Proposition 3). In fact, if the seller could extract the






at ↵ = 0. However, as the bargaining power of the buyer increases, the seller extracts
less value from the renegotiation surplus, and thus exerts lower e↵ort.
4.4 Buyer’s and Seller’s Payo↵s
Given the equilibrium e↵orts derived in the previous sections, we now examine the buyer’s and the
seller’s payo↵ under the di↵erent governance structures. Subsequently, in Section 5, we build on
this discussion to compare the total surplus under di↵erent governance structures.
Agrawal and Oraiopoulos:
The Role of Decision Rights in Co-development Initiatives 17
Proposition 4. The buyer’s payo↵ is maximized when she retains the ex-ante right but delegates
the ex-post decision right to the seller (BS case).
One would expect that the buyer would prefer more control over the project, that is, to retain
both rights. Yet, according to Proposition 4 the buyer is better o↵ with less control over the project,
and can increase her payo↵ by delegating the ex-post decision right to the seller. Recall that in
the case where the buyer retains both rights (BB case), the seller does not exert any e↵ort. By
delegating the ex-post decision right to the seller (BS case), the buyer allows for renegotiation,
which in turn, provides an incentive to the seller to exert e↵ort towards the high-demand state.
Those joint e↵orts by the buyer and the seller lead to a higher probability of achieving a high
market potential. This is why the buyer’s payo↵ is maximized when she delegates the ex-post
decision right, but holds the ex-ante right.
Proposition 5. There exists a threshold bA1(H,L,k)
.
= H+2k 3L
H L , such that for ↵ <
bA1(·), the
seller’s payo↵ is maximized when he retains both rights (SS case). Otherwise, the seller’s payo↵ is
maximized when he retains the ex-ante right but delegates the ex-post decision right to the buyer
(SB case).
Proposition 5 illustrates the counter-intuitive finding that the seller is not always better o↵ by
retaining both rights. In fact, it is particularly when the seller has low bargaining power (↵> bA1(·)),
that he should transfer the ex-post decision right to the buyer. This can be explained as follows.
When the seller retains both rights (SS case), the prospect of renegotiation under the high-demand
state incentivizes both firms to exert e↵ort. The seller, who also holds the ex-ante right, can
appropriate the value of those joint e↵orts, by setting appropriately the contract terms. Yet, as
the bargaining power of the buyer increases, and the buyer appropriates a higher share of the
renegotiation surplus, the prospect of renegotiation becomes less attractive for the seller. Instead,
the seller is better o↵ delegating the ex-post right to the buyer, and only retaining the ex-ante
right. By doing so, the seller can o↵er a renegotiation-proof contract, which restricts the value that
the buyer can appropriate from the initiative, despite her high bargaining power.
5. Comparison of Governance Structures
In this section, we compare the di↵erent governance structures. In order to do so, we use the total
generated surplus as the metric, in line with the extant literature (Hart et al. 1997, Che and Hausch
1999, Corbett and DeCroix 2001, Roels et al. 2010).
Moreover, given our modeling framework, the governance structure that maximizes the total
surplus will also be the one most likely to emerge in practice. The reason for this is as follows:
Under our setting, one party (the buyer or the seller) can make take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers to the other
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party. This is usually the party which is ex-ante more powerful. Under such a framework, there can
be two possibilities: First, this party’s payo↵ is also maximized under the governance structure that
maximizes the total surplus. In which case, the party will clearly choose this governance structure.
Second, this party’s payo↵ is maximized under a di↵erent governance structure than the one that
maximizes the total surplus. In which case, the party will want to increase its payo↵ by moving to
the structure that maximizes the total surplus. This can be done by designing a transfer payment
between the parties such that the other party is indi↵erent between the two governance structures.
This will enable implementing the governance structure that maximizes total surplus, allowing the
party to reap the entire excess surplus from this governance structure. Please see §OF in the Online
Supplement for a more detailed discussion and a proof showing that such a transfer payment can
be designed in our setting. In sum, the governance structure that maximizes the total surplus will
be the one adopted.
Before comparing the total surplus under the di↵erent governance structures, it is worth noting
the following preliminary results: First, all of the governance structures lead to lower total surplus
than the first-best case. Second, recall that when the ex-post decision right is held by the seller, the
equilibrium e↵ort levels are the same irrespective of who holds the ex-ante right (see Proposition
3), and consequently, the total surplus is also the same, i.e., UBS =USS. Third, recall that the only
governance structure where one of the parties does not exert e↵ort towards the project is when the
buyer holds both the decision rights. As such, the case where the buyer holds both the decision
rights leads to lowest total surplus, and is dominated. The next result characterizes the governance
structure that maximizes the total surplus.
Proposition 6. If ↵ < bA1(H,L,k) the total surplus is maximized when the ex-post decision
right is delegated to the seller and the ex-ante right is delegated to either party (BS/SS cases).
Otherwise, it is maximized when the ex-post decision right is delegated to the buyer, but the ex-ante
right is delegated to the seller (SB case). bA1(H,L,k) increases in H and k, but decreases in L.
In order to maximize the total surplus, the governance structure should always delegate right(s)
to the seller. If the buyer has high bargaining power (↵  bA1(·)), then the buyer should hold the
ex-post decision right, but the ex-ante right should be delegated to the seller. Otherwise, the seller
should hold the ex-post decision right, and either party can hold the ex-ante right. The key driver
behind this result is that in a co-development setting the total surplus is maximized when both
parties remain incentivized to exert e↵ort. Recall that in our setting, the downstream firm (the
buyer) is primarily a↵ected by the demand realization, while the upstream firm (the seller), has
lower exposure to it. When the buyer has high bargaining power, incentivizing the seller requires
transferring the ex-ante right to the seller, while at the same time preventing renegotiation by
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leaving the ex-post right to the buyer. In contrast, when the seller has high bargaining power,
allowing for renegotiation is su cient to ensure that both parties remain incentivized, and in turn,
that the total surplus is maximized.
The above result provides several key guidelines for how to choose a governance structure for a
co-development initiative: First, delegating the ex-post decision right to the seller becomes more
attractive as the co-development e↵orts have the potential to make a substantial di↵erence to the
demand realization (i.e., H   L is larger). This can be seen from the threshold bA1(·), which is
increasing in H and decreasing in L. Second, maximizing the total surplus may require a gover-
nance structure that allows for renegotiation rather than one that ensures a renegotiation-proof
mechanism. Renegotiation can be enabled by transferring the ex-post decision right to the seller.
Third, our results show that the governance structure that maximizes the total surplus for a co-
development initiative crucially depends on the position in the value chain of the party with the
higher bargaining power.
Our results also o↵er managerial insights for our motivating examples of the di↵erent co-
development initiatives between the upstream telecommunication equipment provider (seller) and
its downstream partners (buyers). Consider the case of the joint initiative between the seller and
Buyer B. Given that the project’s value was primarily driven by the seller’s proprietary know-how
and technological infrastructure, the seller had a stronger ex-post bargaining position (low ↵).
Accordingly, the initiative was realized under a governance structure where the seller retained the
ex-post decision right, but the ex-ante right was delegated to Buyer B. This is in line with our
results, which suggest a BS governance structure when the seller has stronger ex-post bargaining
position (low ↵). Compare this to the case between the seller and Buyer A. Unfortunately, the
seller insisted on retaining the ex-post decision right (in a way similar to his initiative with Buyer
B), a proposal that was rejected by Buyer A, and eventually, the discussions came to an end despite
the promising nature of the project. A key di↵erence in this case was that in contrast to Buyer B,
Buyer A had a stronger ex-post bargaining position (high ↵). This was because a critical element of
the value of the project was the deep insights into the end-customers’ business models that Buyer
A had acquired through long-standing relationships with them. Our results suggest that the seller
should have delegated the ex-post decision right to Buyer A, but kept the ex-ante right for himself,
i.e., utilize a SB governance structure. The above examples also highlight the need for firms to
adapt the governance structure and be willing to delegate decisions rights depending on the char-
acteristics of the co-development project, rather than attempting to implement a one-size-fits-all
approach.
Another example of successful implementation of a co-development project is the Toshiba-
Sandisk joint development of NAND memories. In this case, Toshiba (seller) has significant ex-post
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bargaining power (low ↵) because it is the inventor of the NAND technology (Toshiba 2016) and
Sandisk (buyer) purchases its vast majority of NAND memories from Toshiba (Sandisk Corp. 2011,
p. 3). Sandisk retained the ex-ante right, but transferred the ex-post decision right to Toshiba. This
corresponds to a BS governance structure, which is consistent with our results. In a contrasting
example, TSMC is a powerful seller that maintains strong ex-post bargaining position (low ↵) given
the importance that its customers place on the technological superiority of its chips (Hou 2017).
It is also known for commanding a strong price premium (Eassa 2017). TSMC typically retains
the ex-post decision right by deciding how much capacity to allocate to each of its buyers (Clarke
2006). This corresponds to a SS governance structure, which is consistent with our results that if
the seller is powerful and maintains strong ex-post bargaining position, both rights should be held
by the seller.
6. Value of Contracting
Our analysis so far, has focused on di↵erent governance structures that specify a menu of non-
contingent transfer payments and the allocation of rights in a co-development project. We have
shown that such governance structures can play a key role in shaping the incentives of each party
to exert e↵ort towards improving the value of the project. However, in some cases, the two par-
ties may forgo signing an ex-ante contract and instead rely completely on ex-post negotiation for
dividing the value generated from the project. In practice, the two parties can sign a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) which describes the scope and an intended course of action for the
project, but without any legal commitment from either party. For example, Pirelli, Rosneft and
Rostec signed an MoU for a joint research and development agreement for innovative materials for
tyres manufacturing (Pirelli 2013). The benefits of forgoing any ex-ante contract have also been
highlighted in the extant literature (Van Mieghem 1999, Che and Hausch 1999) which typically
refers to it as a spot contract.
Under a spot contract, the parties just split the ex-post total profits based on their respective





















denote the equilibrium e↵orts under the spot contract. The following proposi-
tion reveals an interesting result regarding the role of a spot contract on the parties’ e↵ort levels.
Proposition 7. If ↵ < bA2(H,L,k)
.
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H+L 2k , then the seller (buyer) always exerts a higher
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Proposition 7 states that unless the buyer has significant bargaining power, a spot contract leads
to higher e↵ort by the seller, but a lower e↵ort by the buyer. In other words, the spot contract
may be the most e↵ective mechanism to induce e↵ort by the party that has lower exposure to
the demand realization. By relying entirely on renegotiation, the seller becomes more dependent
on the demand realization, and therefore, more incentivized to invest e↵ort to improve it. The
exact opposite takes place for the buyer whose payo↵ now is less dependent on the high-demand
realization, particularly when her bargaining power is low.
The seminal work of Che and Hausch (1999) illustrate that for pure co-operative investments
such as the one considered in our model, parties may be better o↵ not using simple (or non-
contingent) contracts and simply relying on ex-post negotiation. The next result identifies when
including decision rights in non-contingent contracts improves their value as compared to a spot
contract, which is also illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 8. A contract that retains the ex-ante right with the buyer (seller) leads to a higher
payo↵ for the buyer (seller) compared to the spot contract. However, the spot contract maximizes
the total surplus if bA3(H,L,k)< ↵< bA4(H,L,k).
The above proposition shows that a spot contract is appropriate only when the two parties
are relatively similar with respect to their bargaining power. Note that the key advantage of a
spot contract is that the value that each party appropriates is proportional to the total surplus,
and therefore, both parties have an incentive to maximize it. Yet, the actual value that each
party appropriates is also determined by its bargaining power, and as such, incentives remain
well-balanced only when the bargaining powers of the parties are also evenly balanced. Therefore,
the spot contract leads to higher total surplus only for intermediate values of ↵. In contrast, for
co-development initiatives where one of the parties is disproportionately more powerful, such as
those between a large buyer working with a small seller or vice versa, non-contingent contracts
with a judicious allocation of decision rights outperform spot contracts. Specifically, as discussed in
Proposition 6, when the buyer has high bargaining power, the seller should hold only the ex-ante
right. Otherwise, the seller should hold the ex-post decision right.
7. Extensions and Discussion of Assumptions
We now consider two extensions that capture additional considerations and relax some of the
assumptions used in our main analysis.
7.1 Potential for Termination of the Initiative
We now analyze a setting with L < k < H, where it is e cient to only o↵er the product when
M = H. When M = L, it is e cient to terminate the initiative and not o↵er the product, i.e.,
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Note. In both panels, k= 2, L= 3 and c= 6.2. In panel b, H = 6.5, UBB = 1.18 and UF = 2.12.
Qe(L) = 0 and tL = 0. For brevity, a complete characterization of the results for this extension
and other details are relegated to §OC in the Online Supplement. In what follows, we focus on
describing the implications for our key results.
Our results for the BB case continue to hold, i.e., the seller does not exert any e↵ort but the
buyer exerts e↵ort equal to the first-best level (see Proposition 1). Our results for the SB case also
continue to hold, except that the buyer does not exert any e↵ort (see Proposition 2). Proposition
3, which states that the e↵orts are the same under the BS and SS cases continues to hold for
↵< bA5(H,L,k) (see §OC in the Online Supplement for details). When ↵  bA5(H,L,k), the seller
does not exert any e↵ort under the SS governance structure. Accordingly, the BS case leads to
(weakly) higher total surplus than the SS case. The total surplus is maximized under the governance
structure where the buyer holds the ex-ante right but the seller holds the ex-post decision right
(BS case). Accordingly, this result is a special case of our analogous result in Proposition 6. The
reason why the SB case does not maximize the total surplus is that under this extension, the buyer
does not exert any e↵ort under the SB case, requiring the seller to exert a higher e↵ort on his own.
In sum, as in our results for the main analysis, when there is potential for termination of the
initiative, the ex-post decision right should be delegated to the upstream party- the seller, who has
lower exposure to the demand realization.
7.2 Revenue-sharing Contract
In the main paper, we assumed that the contractual structure utilized by the parties was a transfer
payment t from the buyer to the seller for delivering a quantity Q. We now examine a situation
where the parties instead consider a revenue-sharing contract. Under such a contractual structure,
Agrawal and Oraiopoulos:
The Role of Decision Rights in Co-development Initiatives 23
once the market potential is realized, the e cient quantity is chosen, and the parties split the
resulting revenues according to a pre-determined sharing rule. Let ⌘ 2 [0,1] denote the share of
the revenue given to the buyer. Under such a revenue sharing contract, the only decision that the
parties have to make is the revenue share ⌘. Either the buyer or the seller can hold the right to
decide ⌘. Let ⌘Rz denote the optimal revenue share chosen by party z 2 {B,S} when s/he holds the
decision right, and let the resulting equilibrium e↵ort levels and total surplus evaluated at ⌘= ⌘Rz




, and URz, respectively.
For brevity, the details of this analysis are relegated to §OD in the Online Supplement. In what
follows, we focus on describing the main insights from this extension. We find that when the seller
sets the revenue share, he extracts the entire revenues from the buyer, i.e., ⌘RS = 0. Under this
setting, the buyer does not exert any e↵ort (eRS
B
= 0 and eRS
S
> 0). However, when the buyer sets
the revenue share, she has to compensate the seller for the incurred production costs, and thus
always chooses to share some of the revenues with him, i.e., 0< ⌘RB < 1. Under this setting, both





> 0). We can also show that the total surplus is strictly higher when
the revenue share is set by the buyer (as compared to when it is set by the seller).
Note that it is analytically intractable to compare the total surplus under the revenue-sharing
contract with that under the contractual structures studied in our main analysis. However, we
can numerically verify that as long as H   L is not small, the total surplus under the revenue-
sharing contract is strictly lower, i.e., URB <max{UBS,USB} (see §OD in the Online Supplement
for details). That is, under this setting, a revenue-sharing contract is dominated by the quantity
and transfer payment contract considered in our main analysis, and thus, our results throughout
the paper continue to hold for this setting. If instead H  L is small, then the parties prefer using
a revenue-sharing contract, where the buyer should set the revenue share. These results imply that
in the more interesting case for our co-development context, where the parties are developing a
new technology (i.e., H  L is large), a revenue-sharing contract is not attractive for the parties.
8. Conclusions
Motivated by our interactions with a telecommunication equipment provider (seller) that initiated
co-development initiatives with di↵erent IT services companies (buyers), we developed a model
that captures two key elements of the contractual process. First, for such innovative projects,
contingency-based contracts are hard to write, and as such, firms rely on non-contingent commit-
ments. Second, instead of specifying decisions, contracts often specify the party responsible for
making that decision. Such contractual clauses that specify the allocation of decision rights have
been observed across a number of industries (Lerner and Merges 1998, Ryall and Sampson 2009,
Susarla 2012), yet we lack a theoretical framework that studies the design of di↵erent governance
structures and their e↵ectiveness for co-development projects.
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Our results help explain the choice of governance structures for successful implementation of
co-development initiatives in practice. They also provide three principles to design the governance
structure of such co-development initiatives. First, we show that there might be a non-monotonic
relationship between control and incentives to exert e↵ort. Specifically, we show that a seller who
can both propose contracts and also choose between them ex post, will exert less e↵ort, than when
he only has the right to propose contracts. Second, we show that maximizing the value of the
initiative might require allocating both decision rights to the party with the higher bargaining
power. While this might seem counter to an equitable collaboration, it will lead the parties to exert
higher e↵orts. Lastly, we show that renegotiation, which is typically considered an impediment to
investment e↵orts, can actually be used to incentivize e↵orts and improve e ciency, if decision
rights are also appropriately allocated.
Finally, prior empirical literature has studied the allocation of decision rights in IT outsourcing
contracts, where only one party (i.e., the vendor) exerts e↵orts (Susarla 2012). However, there is
a need for empirical research for co-development initiatives where the e↵orts of both parties can
be crucial. Our results could be utilized to formulate hypotheses about how decision rights are
allocated in co-development initiatives and tested using datasets similar to the ones discussed in
Susarla (2012) and references therein. Specifically, our analysis yields the following hypotheses:
i) Projects for which the buyer has high bargaining power, should be associated with governance
structures in which the buyer maintains the ex-post control/decision rights, and rather favorable
payment terms for the seller; ii) Projects for which the seller has high bargaining power, should be
associated with governance structures in which the seller maintains the ex-post control/decision
rights; iii) The seller is more likely to maintain the ex-post control/decision right for projects where
the development e↵orts have the potential to make a substantial di↵erence in the demand outcome.
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Appendix
A1. Proofs.
For all the proofs, let i and j denote the party that has the ex-ante and ex-post right, respectively,
where i, j 2 {B,S}.
We first provide the analysis for the first-best case. In the production stage, the problem is
to choose the quantity Q to maximize the total surplus ⇡e(Q|M) = (M   k   Q)Q, which is
strictly concave in Q. Solving the first-order condition, the e cient quantity is given by Qe(M) =
M k
2
. The problem to determine the co-development e↵orts is given by maxeB ,eS U
F (eB, eS) =
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p(b, s)⇡e(Qe(H)|H)+ (1  p(b, s))⇡e(Qe(L)|L) C(eB) C(eS), where the Hessian of UF (eB, eS) is
negative definite. Therefore, UF (eB, eS) is jointly concave in eB and eS. Solving the first-order con-



























< 1 if and only if c > (H L)(H+L 2k)
4
.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let j = B. Consider a given incentive feasible mechanism  
.
=








,Qe(H)} that is also incentive feasible.
In order for the renegotiation-proof mechanism  
0
to be payo↵-equivalent to the given mechanism
















































































+↵k(QH  QL). These equations together































The above conditions can be rewritten as (H  Qe(H))Qe(H)  t
0
H










, which implies that the renegotiation-proof mech-
anism  
0
is incentive feasible. ⇤
Proof of Propositions 1-2. We first focus on the cases where the buyer has the ex-post decision
right (j = B). From Lemma 1, we can restrict our attention to renegotiation-proof mechanisms,
which we denote by  
.
= {tL,Qe(L), tH ,Qe(H)}. The conditions for this mechanism to be incentive
feasible, we need (H  Qe(H))Qe(H)  tH   (H  Qe(L))Qe(L)  tL and (L Qe(L))Qe(L)  tL  











We next analyze the problem to determine the equilibrium e↵ort levels in the co-development
stage. U 
B
(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eB and U
 
S
(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eS. Solving
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and eS(tH , tL) =
2(tH tL) k(H L)
4c
. Under the assumption x1B(tL)  tH  x2B(tL), the equilibrium e↵orts for these






























if yB(tL)< tH ,
(2)
where x1B(tL)< y1B(tL)<x2B(tL).
Consider the case where the buyer has the ex-ante right (i=B), i.e., the buyer sets the contract
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) is strictly increasing in tH ,







) to 0, which happens at tH = t1(tL) (expression not provided
for brevity). The required condition for this case x1B(tL)< tH  yB(tL) evaluated at tH(tL) = t1(tL)
is given by k(L k)
2








) evaluated at tH = t1(tL) is strictly decreasing in tL, we














next analyze the case where tH > yB(tL), which implies that e
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to 0, which happens at tH = t3(tL) (expression not provided for brevity). The required condition for















Therefore, the local maximizer for this case is tL = tbL
.
= t5 and tH = tbH
.
= t3(t5) (expressions not

















), we find that the
di↵erence between them is given by 3(H L)
2(H 2k+L)2
128c
> 0, which is always positive. Therefore, the








































> 0, and eBB
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= kQe(H), and tBBL = kQe(L). This proves Proposition 1.
Consider the case where the seller has the ex-ante right (i = S). The seller’s problem































) is strictly decreasing in tH and positive






) is strictly increasing in tL, the seller
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< 0, proving Proposition 2. ⇤
Proof of Lemmas 2-3, Proposition 3 and Corollaries 1-2. We now consider the cases where
the seller has the ex-post decision right (j = S). The conditions for a renegotiation-proof mechanism









to tH  Qe(H)  tL Qe(L) and tL Qe(L)  tH  Qe(H). These conditions cannot simultaneously
hold, proving Lemma 2.
There are two possible cases for how the mechanism may be structured:
Case a. tL  Qe(L)> tH  Qe(H) or ⇧ S(L|L)> ⇧
 
S
(H|H). Under this case, the seller will always
chooses the low-quantity contract and renegotiation takes place when M =H. In order to analyze
the problem to determine the equilibrium e↵ort levels in the co-development stage, U 
B
(eB, eS) is
strictly concave in eB and U
 
S
(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eS. Solving the first-order conditions










In order to analyze the problem in the contracting stage, first consider the case where the











) is strictly increasing in tL, the buyer will prefer to set US(eaB, e
a
S
) to 0, which happens







. Next consider the case where the seller also






) such that tL  
Qe(L)> tH  Qe(H), and UB(eaB, eaS)  0. As UB(eaB, eaS) is strictly decreasing in tH and US(eaB, eaS)
is strictly increasing in tL, the seller will prefer to set UB(eaB, e
a
S






Case b. tL  Qe(L)< tH  Qe(H) or ⇧ S(L|L)<⇧
 
S
(H|H). Under this case, the seller will always
choose the high-quantity contract and renegotiation takes place when M =L. In order to analyze




(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eB and U
 
S
(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eS. Solving the first-order




> 0 and eb
S
= 0.
In order to analyze the problem in the contracting stage, first consider the case where the buyer
has the ex-ante right (i=B). In order to analyze the problem in the contracting stage, the buyer’s










) is strictly decreasing in tH and US(ebB, e
b
S
) is strictly increasing in tH , the buyer
will prefer to set US(ebB, e
b
S
) to 0, which happens at tH = t8 (expression not provided for brevity).
Similarly, consider the case where the seller also has the ex-ante right (i= S). The seller’s problem is
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) such that tL Qe(L)< tH  Qe(H) and UB(ebB, ebS)  0. As UB(ebB, ebS)
is strictly decreasing in tH and US(ebB, e
b
S




) to 0, which happens at tH = t9 (expression not provided for brevity).
To prove Lemma 3, we need to compare the payo↵ of the party with the ex-ante right between
Cases 1 and 2 above.
For i = B, the di↵erence between UB(eaB, e
a
S




at tH = t8 is given by
(H L)3(1 ↵)(H 4k+3L+↵(H L))
64c




. Similarly, for i= S, the di↵erence between US(eaB, e
a
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) evaluated at tH = t9 is given by
(H L)3(1 ↵)(H 4k+3L+↵(H L))
64c
> 0. This implies that





(H|H). Therefore, the seller always chooses the low quantity contract in equilibrium and rene-
gotiation takes place only when M =H.












= 0 and UBS
B
> 0 (expressions not pro-








> 0. For i = S, we have tSS
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. The proofs of Corollaries 1-2
follows directly from a comparison of the equilibrium e↵ort levels. ⇤
Proof of Propositions 4-6. The buyer’s payo↵ under di↵erent governance struc-








































= 0, proving Proposition 4.
















































= 0 for ↵ < bA1(·). Otherwise, USBS > USSS > UBSS = UBBS = 0.
d bA1(·)/dH = 2(L k)(H L)2 > 0, d bA1(·)/dL=
 2(H k)
(H L)2 < 0 and d
bA1(·)/dk= 2> 0, proving Proposition 5.
























, which implies that UBS = USS. Therefore, to identify the governance structure that
maximizes the total surplus, we need to compare USB and UBS =USS. In order to do so, recall from





for ↵< bA1(·). Given that USB =USBS and USS =USSS ,
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we have that USS = UBS >USB >UBB for ↵< bA1(·). Otherwise, USB >USS = UBS >UBB. This
proves Proposition 6. ⇤
Proof of Propositions 7-8. We begin by solving for the e↵orts under the spot case. U spot
S
(eB, eS)
is strictly concave in eS and U
spot
B
(eB, eS) is strictly concave in eB. Solving the first-order conditions









Recall from Propositions 1-3, we have that eBB
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> 0, we have eBB
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negative if and only if ↵> bA2(H,L,k) = 2(L k)H+L 2k . This proves Proposition 7.
In order to prove Proposition 8, we need to first prove a couple of preliminaries. USB and UBB are








spot is concave in ↵ as d2U spot/d↵2 =  (H L)
2(H 2k+L)2
16c
< 0. Therefore, there exists




spot  ↵BS = L k
H L > 0, which implies that ↵
BS = ↵SS < ↵spot.




is decreasing in ↵ and zero at





































To prove the second part of Proposition 8, recall from above that USB is independent of ↵ and
U
spot is concave in ↵ and maximized at ↵= ↵spot = 1/2. Moreover, at ↵= 0 and ↵= 1, we have that
U
SB   U spot = (H L)
3(L k)
16c
> 0 and USB   U spot is decreasing in ↵ for ↵ 2 [0,1/2] and increasing



















. In addition, recall that
U




at ↵ = 0 and UBS   U spot =  (L k)
2(H L)2
32c




2(H k) , such that U
BS =USS >U spot only if ↵<a3.
Recall that UBS = USS > USB if and only if ↵ < bA1(H,L,k), where bA1(H,L,k) < 1 and
bA1(H,L,k) > 0 only if H > 3L  2k. If H > 2L  k +
p
5(L  k), then 0 < a1 < a3 < bA1(·) < a2.
This implies that the total surplus is maximized under the BS case when ↵< a3, spot case when
a3  ↵  a2, and SB/SS cases when ↵ > a2. If  2k + 3L  H  2L   k +
p
5(L   k), we have
0< bA1(·)<a3 <a1 <a2. This implies that the total surplus is maximized under the BS case when
↵< bA1(·), under the SB case when bA1  ↵<a1 and ↵>a2, and under the spot case if a1  ↵ a2.
Finally, if H <  2k + 3L, then bA1(·) < 0 < a3 < a1 < a2. This implies that the total surplus is
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maximized under the SB case when ↵< ↵1 and ↵> a2, and otherwise it is maximized under the
spot case.
Summarizing the above: The total surplus is maximized under the spot case if bA3(H,L,k) 
↵  bA4(H,L,k), where bA4(H,L,k)
.
= a2 and bA3(H,L,k) = a3 for H > 2L   k +
p
5(L   k) and
bA3(H,L,k) = a1 for H  2L  k+
p
5(L  k). Otherwise, the total surplus is maximized under the
BS case if ↵< bA1(H,L,k) and under the SB/SS cases otherwise. This proves Proposition 8. ⇤
Online Supplement for The Role of Decision Rights in
Co-development Initiatives
OA. Di↵erent costs of e↵ort.
In the main model, we assumed that both parties have the same cost of e↵ort. We now consider
an extension where these costs can di↵er. In particular, we now assume that the cost of e↵ort is
given by cBx
2
for the buyer and cSx
2
for the seller, where cB, cS > 0. In what follows, we focus on
investigating the robustness of our results under this extension. For brevity, the proofs and details
of this extension are available in a Technical Appendix (available on request). We can show that
most of our key results and insights continue to hold.










, where 0 <  (·) < 1.
• Let  (H,L, k) < cB
cS
 1. We find that our analysis for all four of the governance structures
is structurally similar to our main analysis. The only change is that the cost factor c in the
expressions for the equilibrium decisions and payo↵s is replaced by cB and cS as appropriate.





> 1. The seller’s cost of e↵ort is lower than the buyer’s cost under this setting. The
analysis for the BS, SB and SS governance structures continues to remain structurally similar
to our main analysis. The only change is that the cost factor c in the expressions for the
equilibrium decisions and payo↵s is replaced by cB and cS as appropriate. However, the seller
may exert e↵ort for the BB case (i.e., e
BB
S
> 0). This may lead the total surplus to be











  (H,L, k). We find that our analysis for all the governance structures except SB is
structurally similar to our main analysis. The only change is that the cost factor c is replaced
by cB and cS as appropriate in the expressions for the equilibrium decisions and payo↵s.















OB. General specification for p(b, s).
In the main paper, we assumed that p(b, s) = eB + eS . We can generalize our model to assume
p(eB, eS) =  (eB + eS) + (1    )eBeS , where   2 (0, 1].1 Note that at   = 1, it simplifies to the
specification used in our main analysis. The generalization for p(eB, eS) with   6= 1 renders our
model analytically intractable, even for the relatively simpler case where the buyer holds both the
rights. However, we can numerically verify whether our results hold for this general specification.
To that end, we conducted a numerical analysis by generating all possible combinations (30,240
in total) for the following parameter values: five equally-spaced levels for ↵ 2 [0.1, 0.9], nine
equally-spaced levels for   2 [0.1, 1], c = 6, four equally-spaced levels for H 2 [6, 6.4, 6.8, 7.2] and
thirteen equally-spaced levels for L, k 2 [2.4, 7.2]. We only retain the 11,960 combinations where






)  1 hold. For each of the combinations of parameter
values, we use numerical optimization to obtain the equilibrium e↵orts, parties’ payo↵s, and total
surplus.
Based on this extensive numerical analysis, we find that our key results continue to structurally
and qualitatively hold. In particular, we find that the results regarding comparisons of equilibrium
e↵orts in Propositions 2-3 and 7, and Corollaries 1-2 remain unchanged. Similarly, our result in
Proposition 6 continues to qualitatively hold in that the total surplus is maximized under the BS/SS
cases for low values of ↵, and under the SB case otherwise. The only di↵erence in our results is that










) can happen for for moderate values of  . However, our general insight that the
seller’s e↵ort is lowest under the BB governance structure continues to hold.
OC. Potential for Termination of the Initiative.
For this extension, consider the setting with L < k < H, which implies that it is e cient to
terminate the initiative when M = L. That is, Qe(L) = 0 and tL = 0. For brevity, the details and
proofs for this extension are available in a Technical Appendix (available on request).
We begin by considering the cases where the buyer has the ex-post decision right (j = B).
Lemma 1 from the paper continues to hold, i.e., we can restrict our attention to renegotiation-proof
mechanisms. As can be seen from Propositions C1 and C2 below, Propositions 1 and 2 from the










), while the seller does not exert any e↵ort (eBB
S
= 0).
Proposition C2. When only the ex-ante right is delegated to the seller, the seller exerts more e↵ort











We next consider the cases where the seller has the ex-post decision right (j = S). Lemma 2
from the paper continues to hold, i.e., a renegotiation-proof mechanism cannot be incentive feasible.
1Note that when   = 0, the e↵orts are perfect complements (i.e., p(eB , eS) = eBeS). Under this extreme case,
neither party will exert e↵ort because they anticipate lower e↵ort by the other party, in line with the results typically
obtained in similar models with a non-contingent context (see Lee and Li 2018, p. 14 for an example).
2
As can be seen from Lemma C3a below, Lemma 3 from the paper continues to hold for the BS
case. Note that under a spot contract, the parties will also rely on ex-post negotiation to o↵er the
product when M = H, but when M = L, they will choose to terminate the initiative under this
extension. Accordingly, the outcomes under the BS case become equivalent to the spot contract.
Lemma C3a. For the BS case, the contract terms are set such that the seller always chooses the
contract which is e cient in the low state, i.e., to terminate the initiative. Therefore, renegotiation
takes place only when M = H.
According to the Lemma C3b below, Lemma 3 holds for the SS case only if ↵ < bA5(H,L).
Lemma C3b. For the SS case, if ↵ < bA5(H,L), then the contract terms are set such that the
seller always chooses the contract which is e cient in the low state, i.e., to terminate the initiative,
and renegotiation takes place only when M = H. Otherwise, the contract terms are set such that
the seller always chooses the contract e cient in the high state, i.e., when M = L, renegotiation
takes place to terminate the initiative.
Proposition C3a shows that Proposition 3 continues to hold for ↵ < bA5(H,L). Moreover, Propo-
sition C3b below shows that the total surplus is (weakly) higher under the BS case as compared
to the SS case. In addition, the BS case is equivalent to the spot case when there is potential for
termination of the initiative.
Proposition C3a. When the seller holds the ex-post decision right, the equilibrium e↵orts are








Proposition C3b. The total surplus is weakly higher under the BS case as compared to the SS












, and UBS = U spot.













Proposition C4 below shows that the total surplus is maximized under the BS governance structure.
Proposition C4. The buyer’s payo↵ is maximized when she retains both the rights (BB case).
The seller’s payo↵ is maximized when she retains the ex-ante right, but the ex-post decision right
is held by the buyer (SB case). The total surplus is maximized when he retains the ex-ante right
but delegates the ex-post decision right to the seller buyer (BS case).
OD. Revenue sharing contractual structure.
In what follows, we will provide details for the results of this extension. For brevity, the proofs for
Lemmas D1 and D2 are available in a Technical Appendix (available on request).
Let ⌘ 2 [0, 1] denote the share of the revenue given to the buyer. Under such a revenue sharing
contract, the only decision that the parties have to make is the revenue share ⌘. Either the buyer
or the seller can hold the right to decide ⌘. Let the party with this right be denoted by z 2 {B,S}.
We use the superscript R to denote the decisions and expressions related to the revenue-sharing
contract. The parties’ ex-post payo↵s can be written as ⇧
R
B




(M |⌘) .= (1 ⌘)(M  Qe(M))Qe(M) kQe(M), where Qe(M) = argmax0QM ⇡e(Q|M) is the
3
e cient quantity that maximizes the total surplus. Note that the seller incurs the production cost
k to manufacture and deliver the product to the buyer. For a given revenue share ⌘, the parties’































(eB, eS |⌘) denote the optimal


















|⌘)   0. Let ⌘Rz denote the optimal revenue share chosen by party z when s/he
holds the decision right, and let the resulting equilibrium e↵ort levels and total surplus evaluated
at ⌘ = ⌘
Rz









Lemma D1 shows our preliminary result that when the seller sets the revenue share, he will
choose to extract the entire revenue. However, when the buyer sets the revenue share, she will
allocate a strictly positive share to the seller.
Lemma D1. When the seller sets the revenue share, ⌘RS = 0, eRS
B
= 0 but eRS
S
> 0. However,






The intuition for the above result is quite straightforward. The party who sets the revenue









|⌘) = 0). Recall that the seller has to incur the production cost to deliver the products,
and the buyer only enjoys a share of the realized revenues. Therefore, when the seller sets ⌘, he
extracts the entire revenues from the buyer. When the buyer sets ⌘, she has to compensate the
seller for the incurred production costs, and thus always chooses to share some of the revenues with
him.
The next lemma compares the total surplus under a revenue sharing contract to identify which
party should set the revenue share.
Lemma D2. The total surplus when the revenue share is set by the buyer is strictly higher than
when it is set by the seller.
The above result implies that to investigate whether a revenue-sharing contract may be preferred
to the contractual structure in our main analysis, we only need to consider a revenue-sharing
contract where ⌘ is chosen by the buyer. In order to examine this, we need to compare U
RB
with











is analytically intractable. However, we can numerically
verify that the result for this comparison follows a very clear structure, which is also illustrated
in Figure 1: As long as H   L is not small, the total surplus under this revenue-sharing contract
(U
RB
) is strictly lower than that under the contractual structure (max{UBS , USB}). That is, in
the more interesting case for our co-development context, where the parties are developing a novel
technology, a revenue sharing contract is always dominated by the contractual structure considered
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Figure 1: When does a revenue-sharing contract lead to higher total surplus than the contracts
considered in our main analysis? In the figure, k = 2, L = 3 and c = 6.2. As long as H   L is


















in our main analysis.





where c > 0 Cost of e↵ort x
M 2 {H,L} where H > L Market potential
p(eB , eS) Probability of achieving high market potential
Qe(M) E cient quantity decision for market potential M
tM Transfer payment from buyer to seller when contract M is executed
QM Quantity decision when contract M is executed
k Unit production cost incurred by the seller
↵ (1  ↵) Bargaining power of the buyer (seller)
OF. Details for why the total-surplus maximizing governance structure will be
adopted.
Seller is ex-ante powerful. In this case, the seller is the party that initially holds the right
to make the take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers. The seller’s payo↵ is maximized under the SS governance
structure for ↵ < bA1(·) and under the SB governance structure otherwise (see Proposition ??). Note
from Proposition ?? that the total surplus is also maximized under the SS governance structure
for ↵ < bA1(·) and under the SB governance structure otherwise. This implies that the governance
structure that maximizes the seller’s payo↵ also maximizes the total surplus for all values of ↵.
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That is, if the seller is ex-ante powerful, the governance structure that emerges in practice will be
the one that maximizes the total surplus.
Buyer is ex-ante powerful. In this case, the buyer is the party that initially holds the right
to make the take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers. The buyer’s payo↵ is maximized under the BS governance
structure for all ↵ (see Proposition ??). The BS governance structure also maximizes the total
surplus for ↵ < bA1(·) (see Proposition ??). This implies that if ↵ < bA1(·), the governance structure
that emerges in practice will be the one that maximizes the total surplus. If ↵   bA1(·), then the
total surplus is maximized under the SB governance structure. In this case, it can be shown that
the buyer can design a transfer-payment scheme such that the resulting payo↵s for both the parties
are strictly higher by moving to the total-surplus maximizing (SB) governance structure (see proof
below).
Proof: Let this transfer payment from the seller to the buyer be denoted by X. Such a transfer
payment would lead the payo↵ from the SB governance structure to be U
SB
B




 X for the seller. For the buyer to prefer delegating the ex-ante right to the seller to utilize
the SB governance structure, we need U
SB
B






  X > UBS
S
to simultaneously
















= 0, these conditions simplify
to X > U
BS
and X < U
SB
. This condition can also be written as U
BS







holds because ↵   bA1(·). This implies that there exists a transfer payment X > 0
from the seller to the buyer which makes the SB governance structure pareto improving for both
parties.
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